Under renewed assault by Turkish-backed militias since early December, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria have showcased its nascent drone capabilities through counterstrikes using first-person view drones, which the group says it developed domestically.
Armed Syrian militias operating under the banner of the self-styled Syrian National Army began a campaign against Kurds in Aleppo province in early December as the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham spearheaded the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. That SNA campaign displaced tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians from their homes in Aleppo province.
Daily SNA-SDF clashes along the Euphrates River are ongoing. With supporting Turkish air and drone strikes, the SNA is attempting to seize the strategic Tishreen Dam and Qaraquzaq bridge from the SDF, which would give them a bridgehead into the Syrian Kurdish heartland in northeast Syria. Turkish drones have targeted civilian convoys headed to the former to protest the SNA attacks, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries. The SDF has repeatedly warned that SNA attacks around the dam could result in a catastrophic collapse.
Amid this onslaught, the SDF has publicized several clips showcasing FPV drone strikes targeting the SNA. One recent video depicted repeated SDF FPV drone strikes against SNA armored vehicles, which forced the group to withdraw from their position. The capability gives the SDF some badly-needed edge over these forces, which have a powerful backer in Turkey, a country with one of the most formidable homegrown drone arsenals in the world.
A Syrian Kurdish official told Al-Monitor that Turkey mainly supported the SNA with drone strikes earlier in the campaign but has recently deployed fighter jets as well “because the (SNA) is failing.”
Operated by the group’s Martyr Haroun Units, the SDF drones are not nearly as sophisticated as their Turkish-built counterparts, such as the Bayraktar TB2. Nevertheless, they play a significant role in the SDF’s efforts to fend off SNA onslaughts. These drones enable the SDF to keep pressure on the SNA on the west bank of the Euphrates, especially around Manbij. The ability to monitor and accurately strike targets on that side of the river could also complicate any SNA attempt to position its forces for a mass cross-river assault.
The SDF has also demonstrated a hitherto unknown capability to shoot down some Turkish TB2s and at least one larger Aksungur drone during these clashes. The incidents indicate that Turkish drones can no longer strike Syrian Kurdish territories with complete impunity, which they’ve done for years. The SDF also accidentally shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper it had mistaken for a Turkish drone over northeast Syria.
Where the SDF attained this air defense capability remains unclear. On the other hand, the group is adamant that its FPV drones are wholly homegrown.
The SDF clarified this in response to a dubious report in a hard-line conservative Turkish newspaper that claimed Iran had agreed to supply 1,500 loitering munitions to Kurdish forces fighting Turkey and its militia proxies. The purported shipment, the report claimed, was delayed after Turkey learned of the agreement and threatened to interdict any delivery.
Farhad Shami, Director of the SDF Media Center, categorically denied the report in a press statement, accusing state-run Turkish media of “grappling with a crisis of fabricating false news.”
“Our fighters, drawing on their extensive experience in combating the terrorist organization ISIS, have worked during the past period to develop their own military capabilities, including drones, which are the product of a purely self experience of the people of North and East Syria,” his statement concluded.
Furthermore, a Kurdish military official told the Jerusalem Post that the SDF “did not acquire any drone capabilities” from Iran. Echoing Shami, the official affirmed, “Our drone capabilities are very basic, and they are all made in-house, in initiatives led by our fighters.”
The SDF claims are credible. After all, off-the-shelf commercial quadcopter drones modified to carry explosives for one-way ground attack missions are ubiquitous on the battlefields of the 2020s. Ukraine alone produced over a million FPV drones last year, and these simple mass-produced drones remain Kyiv’s biggest tank killers.
Mere weeks before Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched its decisive offensive against the Assad regime, Ukrainian intelligence sent 20 drone operators along with 150 FPV drones to enhance the group’s capabilities.
In its offensive, HTS used both short-range FPV drones rigged with explosives and longer-range rocket-propelled loitering munitions that could travel up to 30 miles and carry larger payloads. These enabled the group to strike behind the Assad regime’s lines and take out heavy weapons such as artillery and tanks, paving the way for the overwhelmingly successful ground offensive.
Many of these drones are likely more advanced than the ones the SDF currently has in its modest, domestically developed arsenal. Nevertheless, it’s already become a capability the SNA cannot readily afford to dismiss, and one the SDF is likely to gradually enhance from combat experience, especially if the SNA persists in these attacks.
Paul Iddon Where the SDF attained this air defense capability remains unclear. On the other hand, the group is adamant that its FPV drones are wholly homegrown.
The SDF clarified this in response to a dubious report in a hard-line conservative Turkish newspaper that claimed Iran had agreed to supply 1,500 loitering munitions to Kurdish forces fighting Turkey and its militia proxies. The purported shipment, the report claimed, was delayed after Turkey learned of the agreement and threatened to interdict any delivery.
Farhad Shami, Director of the SDF Media Center, categorically denied the report in a press statement, accusing state-run Turkish media of “grappling with a crisis of fabricating false news.”
“Our fighters, drawing on their extensive experience in combating the terrorist organization ISIS, have worked during the past period to develop their own military capabilities, including drones, which are the product of a purely self experience of the people of North and East Syria,” his statement concluded.
Furthermore, a Kurdish military official told the Jerusalem Post that the SDF “did not acquire any drone capabilities” from Iran. Echoing Shami, the official affirmed, “Our drone capabilities are very basic, and they are all made in-house, in initiatives led by our fighters.”
The SDF claims are credible. After all, off-the-shelf commercial quadcopter drones modified to carry explosives for one-way ground attack missions are ubiquitous on the battlefields of the 2020s. Ukraine alone produced over a million FPV drones last year, and these simple mass-produced drones remain Kyiv’s biggest tank killers.
Mere weeks before Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched its decisive offensive against the Assad regime, Ukrainian intelligence sent 20 drone operators along with 150 FPV drones to enhance the group’s capabilities.
In its offensive, HTS used both short-range FPV drones rigged with explosives and longer-range rocket-propelled loitering munitions that could travel up to 30 miles and carry larger payloads. These enabled the group to strike behind the Assad regime’s lines and take out heavy weapons such as artillery and tanks, paving the way for the overwhelmingly successful ground offensive.
Many of these drones are likely more advanced than the ones the SDF currently has in its modest, domestically developed arsenal. Nevertheless, it’s already become a capability the SNA cannot readily afford to dismiss, and one the SDF is likely to gradually enhance from combat experience, especially if the SNA persists in these attacks.
Paul Iddon is a freelance writer and journalist who writes regularly and extensively about Middle East conflicts, military affairs, geopolitics, and history. He has had hundreds of analyses on regional developments published in various regional and international media outlets over the past decade. Iddon has been a regular Forbes.com contributor since June 2020. Follow Iddon for frequent, up-to-date analysis related to Middle East developments and arms deals and transfers in the region and beyond.